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Abstract
The independence phenomenon in set theory, while perva-
sive, can be partially addressed through the use of large cardinal
axioms. A commonly assumed idea is that large cardinal axioms
are species of maximality principles. In this paper, I argue that
whether or not large cardinal axioms count as maximality prin-
ciples depends on prior commitments concerning the richness of
the subset forming operation. In particular I argue that there is
a conception of maximality through absoluteness, on which large
cardinal axioms are restrictive. I argue, however, that large cardi-
nals are still important axioms of set theory and can play many
of their usual foundational roles.
Introduction
Large cardinal axioms are widely viewed as some of the best candi-
dates for new axioms of set theory. They are (apparently) linearly
ordered by consistency strength, have substantial mathematical con-
sequences for questions independent from ZFC (such as consistency
statements and Projective Determinacy1), and appear natural to the
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working set theorist, providing fine-grained information about differ-
ent properties of transfinite sets. They are considered mathematically
interesting and central for the study of set theory and its philosophy.
In this paper, I do not deny any of the above views. I will, however,
argue that the status of large cardinal axioms as maximality principles
is questionable. In particular, I will argue that there is a conception of
maximality in set theory on which large cardinal axioms are viewed as
restrictive principles and serve to leave out the consideration of certain
subsets. Despite this, we’ll see that they are nonetheless able to carry
out many of their key foundational roles in this context.
Here’s the plan: First (§1) I’ll provide some background, explain
the absoluteness principle we will consider (the Class-Generic Inner
Model Hypothesis or CIMH) and argue that on this perspective many
versions of ZFC with large cardinals added come out as restrictive (in
particular relative to Maddy’s notion of restrictiveness). Next (§2) I’ll
compare the justification of the CIMH with that of bounded forcing ax-
ioms, arguing that they rest on similar maximality motivations, but
calibrate them in very different ways. I’ll then (§3) argue that large
cardinals can still fulfil many of their required foundational roles. Fi-
nally (§4) I’ll conclude with some possible ramifications for the study
of the philosophy of set theory and some open questions.
1 Large cardinals, the Class-Generic Inner Model
Hypothesis, and restrictiveness
In this section, I’ll accomplish three things. First (§1.1) I’ll provide
some background on large cardinals and how they have been viewed
philosophically. Second (§1.2) I’ll explain the core absoluteness princi-
ple we will use to generate the problem for the friend of large cardi-
nals, namely the Class-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis. Third (§1.3) I’ll
argue that from this perspective ZFC with large cardinals added ap-
pears restrictive, up to the level of many measurable cardinals. In this
latter regard, we’ll look at Maddy’s characterisation of restrictiveness.
1.1 Large cardinals
This initial material will be familiar to specialists, but I include it sim-
ply for clarity and because our main point is rather philosophical in na-
ture: The place of large cardinals in set theory requires further sharp-
ening of the powerset operation. Time-pressed readers are invited to
proceed directly to §1.2.
2
Given a set theory capable of axiomatising a reasonable fragment
of arithmetic (i.e. able to support the coding of the relevant syntactic
notions), we start our discussion with the following celebrated theo-
rem:
Theorem 1. [Go¨del, 1931] (Second Incompleteness Theorem). No ω-
consistent recursive theory T capable of axiomatising primitive recur-
sive arithmetic can prove its own consistency sentence Con(T).
Given then some appropriately strong set theory T, we can then
obtain a strictly stronger theory by adding Con(T) to T. So, if we
accept ‘ZFC’ then, ZFC + Con(ZFC) is a strictly stronger theory, and
ZFC+ Con(ZFC+ Con(ZFC)) is strictly stronger still. More generally:
Definition 2. A theory T has greater consistency strength than S if
we can prove Con(S) from Con(T), but cannot prove Con(T) from
Con(S). They are called equiconsistent iff we can both prove Con(T)
from Con(S) and Con(S) from Con(T).2
The interesting fact for current purposes is that in set theory we are
not limited to increasing consistency strength solely through adding
Go¨del-style diagonal sentences. The axiom which asserts the existence
of a transitive model of ZFC is stronger still (such an axiom implies
the consistency of theories with transfinite iterations of the consistency
sentence for ZFC). As it turns out, by postulating the existence of cer-
tain kinds of models, embeddings, and varieties of sets, we discover
theories with greater consistency strength. For example:
Definition 3. (ZFC) A cardinal κ is strongly inaccessible iff it is un-
countable, regular (i.e. there is no function from a smaller cardinal
unbounded in κ), and a strong limit cardinal (i.e. if |x| < κ then
|P(x)| < κ).
Such an axiom provides a model for second-order ZFC2, namely
(Vκ,∈,Vκ+1). These cardinals represent the first steps on an enormous
hierarchy of logically and combinatorially characterised objects.3 More
generally, we have the following rough idea: A large cardinal axiom
2A subtlety here concerns what base theory we should use to prove these equicon-
sistency claims. Number theory will do (since consistency statements are number-
theoretic facts), but we will keep discussion mostly at the level of a suitable set theory
(e.g. ZFC).
3Often, combinatorial and logical characterisations go hand in hand, such as in
the case of measurable cardinals. However, sometimes it is not clear how to get one
characterisation from another. Recently, cardinals often thought of as having only
combinatorial characterisations have been found to have embedding characterisa-
tions. See [Holy et al., S] for details.
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is a principle that serves as a natural stepping stone in the indexing of
consistency strength.
In the case of inaccessibles, many of the logical properties attach-
ing to the cardinal appear to derive from its brute size. For example,
it is because of the fact that such a κ cannot be reached ‘from below’
by either of the axioms of Replacement or Powerset that (Vκ,∈,Vκ+1)
satisfies ZFC2. In addition, this is often the case for other kinds of car-
dinal and consistency implications. A Mahlo cardinal, for example, is
a strongly inaccessible cardinal κ beneath which there is a stationary
set (i.e. an S ⊆ κ such that S intersects every closed and unbounded
subset of κ) of inaccessible cardinals. The fact that such a cardinal has
higher consistency strength than that of strong inaccessibles (and mild
strengthenings thereof) is simply because it contains many models of
these axioms below it.
It is not the case, however, that consistency strength is inextricably
tied to size. For example, the notion of a strong4 cardinal has lower
consistency strength than that of superstrong5 cardinal, but the least
strong cardinal is larger than the least superstrong cardinal.6 The key
point is that despite the fact that the least superstrong is not as big as
the least strong cardinal, one can always build a model of a strong car-
dinal from the existence of a superstrong cardinal (but not vice versa).
Thus, despite the fact that a superstrong cardinal can be ‘smaller’, it
still witnesses the consistency of the existence of a strong cardinal.
Before we move on, we note some foundational uses for large car-
dinals that make them especially attractive objects of study. First:
Fact. The ‘natural’ large cardinal principles appear to be linearly or-
dered by consistency strength.
One can gerrymander principles (via metamathematical coding)
that would produce only a partial-order of consistency strengths7,
however it is an empirical fact that the large cardinal axioms that set
theorists have naturally come up with and view as interesting are lin-
early ordered.8 This empirical fact has resulted in the following feature
of mathematical practice:
4A cardinal κ is strong iff for all ordinals λ, there is a non-trivial elementary em-
bedding (to be discussed later) j : V −→ M, with critical point κ, and in which
Vλ ⊆M.
5A cardinal κ is superstrong iff it is the critical point of a non-trivial elementary
embedding j : V −→M such that Vj(κ) ⊆M.
6See [Kanamori, 2009], p. 360.
7See [Koellner, 2011] for discussion.
8There are some open questions to be tied up, for example around strongly com-
pact cardinals and around Jo´nsson cardinals.
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Fact. Large cardinals serve as the the natural indices of consistency
strength in mathematics.
In particular, if consistency concerns are raised about a new branch
of mathematics, the usual way to assess our confidence in the consis-
tency of the practice is to provide a model for the relevant theory with
sets, possibly using large cardinals.9 For example, worries of consis-
tency were raised during the emergence of category theory, and were
assuaged by providing a set-theoretic interpretation, which then freed
mathematicians to use the category-theoretic language with security.
Grothendieck postulated the existence of universes (equivalent to the
existence of inaccessible cardinals), and Mac Lane is very careful to use
universes in his expository textbook for the working mathematician.10
These later found application in interpreting some of the cohomolog-
ical notions used in the original Wiles-Taylor proof of Fermat’s Last
Theorem (see [McLarty, 2010]). Of course now category theory is a
well-established discipline in its own right, and quite possibly stands
free of set-theoretic foundations. Nonetheless, set theory was useful
providing an upper bound for the consistency strength of the emerg-
ing mathematical field. More recently, several category-theoretic prin-
ciples (even some studied in the 1960s) have been calibrated to have
substantial large cardinal strength.11
This observation concerning the role of large cardinals in contem-
porary mathematics point to a central desideratum for their use:
Interpretative Power. Large cardinals are required to maximise inter-
pretative power: We want our theory of sets to facilitate a unified foun-
dational theory in which all mathematics can be developed.12
9See here, for example, Steel:
“The central role of the theories axiomatized by large cardinal hypothe-
ses argues for adding such hypotheses to our framework. The goal
of our framework theory is to maximize interpretative power, to pro-
vide a language and theory in which all mathematics, of today, and
of the future so far as we can anticipate it today, can be developed.”
([Steel, 2014], p. 11)
10See [Mac Lane, 1971], Ch.1, §6. Also interesting here is [McLarty, 1992], Ch. 12.
11See [Bagaria and Brooke-Taylor, 2013] for details. The consistency strength is
really quite high; many category-theoretic statements turn out to be equivalent to
Vopeˇnka’s Principle.
12This idea is strongly emphasised in [Steel, 2014] and has a strong affinity
with Penelope Maddy’s principles UNIFY and MAXIMIZE (see [Maddy, 1997] and
[Maddy, 1998]). We will discuss the latter in due course.
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Maximising interpretative power entails maximising consistency
strength; we want a theory that is able to incorporate as much consis-
tent mathematics as is possible whilst preserving a sense of intended
interpretation, and hence (assuming the actual consistency of the rele-
vant cardinals) require the consistency strength of our framework the-
ory to be very high.
One particular way in which large cardinals are used to generate
‘nice’ interpretations is via the building of inner models. For many
large cardinal axioms we can (using the relevant large cardinal axioms)
build a model that takes itself to contain a cardinal of a particular kind.
For many cardinals we can build models that are L-like and satisfy
properties such as condensation, revealing a good deal of information
about the properties of the sets they contain (relative to the model).
Again, the details are rather technical, so we omit them.13 The point
is the following: Often in set theory we have very little information
about the properties of certain sets, as exhibited by the independence
phenomenon. This is not so for large cardinals with L-like inner mod-
els, where (whilst there are open questions) there is a large amount
of highly tractable information concerning the objects. The building
of inner models for large cardinals thus represents an important and
technically sophisticated area of study, and many of the major open
questions in set theory concern their construction.
The final (related) point that we shall make about large cardinals is
their use in proving axioms of definable determinacy. The full details
will be familiar to specialists and obscure to non-specialists, so we omit
them here.14 Nonetheless, a coarse description will be helpful in stat-
ing our arguments. Roughly put, axioms of definable determinacy as-
sert (schematic) claims about second-order arithmetic, postulating the
existence of winning strategies for games played with natural num-
bers.15 Importantly, some authors have argued that these axioms have
various pleasant consequences we would like to capture.16 One salient
fact is that Projective Determinacy yields high degree of completeness
for the hereditarily countable sets (i.e. there are no known statements
apart from Go¨del style diagonal sentences independent from the the-
13For the state of the art concerning inner model theory and the challenges faced,
see [Sargsyan, 2013] and [Woodin, 2017]. For an overview of what makes a model
L-like, see [Steel, 2010], especially §5 and Theorems 5.1 and 5.4.
14The interested reader is directed to [Schindler, 2014] for a recent presentation of
the technical details, and [Koellner, 2006], [Maddy, 2011], and [Koellner, 2014] for a
philosophical discussion.
15There are also versions of determinacy for real-valued games, or games of longer
length. We put aside these issues here.
16See, for example, [Maddy, 2011] and [Welch, 2017].
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ory ZFC-Powerset+V = H(ω1)+PD).17 Moreover, whilst it is a theorem
of ZFC that not all games are determined, certain restricted forms can
be proved from large cardinals. For example:
Fact. Borel Determinacy is provable in ZFC, but any proof requires ω1-
many applications of the Powerset Axiom.
Fact. Analytic Determinacy is provable in ZFC+“There exists a mea-
surable cardinal”, but is independent from ZFC.
Fact. Projective Determinacy is provable in ZFC+ “For every n ∈ N,
there are n-many Woodin cardinals”, but is independent from ZFC+
“There exists a measurable cardinal”.
Fact. The Axiom of Determinacy for L(R) is provable in ZFC+ “There
are ω-many Woodin cardinals with a measurable above them all”, but
is not provable in ZFC+ “For every n ∈ N, there are n-many Woodin
cardinals”
Again, we will not go through the definitions of Borel, Analytic,
Projective, or L(R) here. Suffice to say, each admits progressively more
sets of reals with a more permissive notion of definability, and each
is resolved by strictly stronger large cardinal axioms. Some authors
have pointed out that it may well be that our ‘best’ theory of sets uses
axioms of definable determinacy.18
Key to large cardinals is that they are often seen as species of max-
imality principles. For example, Go¨del famously wrote (concerning
small large cardinals like inaccessibles, Mahlos etc.):
“...the axioms of set theory by no means form a system
closed in itself, but, quite on the contrary, the very concept
of set on which they are based suggests their extension by
new axioms which assert the existence of still further iter-
ations of the operation “set of”. These axioms can also be
formulated as propositions asserting the existence of very
great cardinal numbers or (which is the same) of sets hav-
ing these cardinal numbers.” ([Go¨del, 1947], p. 181)
17[Koellner, 2014] provides a detailed survey of the literature here, and is quick to
point out that axioms of definable determinacy seem to be the consequence of any
strong ‘natural’ theory extending ZFC (e.g. ZFC+PFA). Given the focus of this paper,
we shall concern ourselves only with the argument from large cardinals.
18See, for example, [Woodin, 2001].
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Here, we see Go¨del argue that the postulation of small large cardi-
nals serves as a good way of asserting that the universe of sets contains
‘large’ sets.19
We can now summarise the following points from our discussion
of large cardinals:
(1.) Large cardinals appear to be linearly ordered by consistency
strength (and hence are the standard indicies of consistency
strength).
(2.) They are used to interpret theories in ‘natural’ contexts (i.e. they
maximise interpretive power).
(3.) They are used in various technical model-building constructions
in inner model theory.
(4.) They can be used to prove axioms of definable determinacy.
(5.) They are often regarded as species of ‘maximality’ axiom.
In the rest of the paper, I will first argue that large cardinals can
appear restrictive from a certain perspective, and thus their status as
maximality principles is questionable (i.e. I argue against (5.)). We
will, however, see that their important foundational roles as outlined
by (1.)–(3.) are unaffected, and that the question of their role in (4.) is
still open.
1.2 The Class-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis
The principle we will consider (the Class-Generic Inner Model Hy-
pothesis) stems from absoluteness considerations; if something is satis-
fied in an extension of the universe then it is already satisfied in the
universe (subject to terms and conditions, and in certain contexts). We
will discuss this absoluteness idea in detail in §2, for now we focus on
defining the principle in order to move forward with our restrictive-
ness arguments. Before we get going, however, it is useful to set up
some terminology:
Definition 4. (NBG) A width extension of a universe V is a universe V ′
such that V is an inner model of V ′ (i.e. V is a transitive model inside
V ′ with the same ordinals). A width extension V ′ is proper when V is a
proper inner model of V ′.
19Several other authors discuss this idea, and are sensitive to its pitfalls. See, for
example, [Hauser, 2001], (p. 257) [Incurvati, 2017] (p. 162), [Maddy, 2011] (pp. 125–
126), [Drake, 1974] (p. 186).
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We can then consider what inner models V (our universe) must
contain relative to its extensions. In particular we can formulate:
Definition 5. [Friedman, 2006] Let φ be a parameter-free first-order
sentence. The Inner Model Hypothesis (or IMH) states that if φ is true
in an inner model of a width extension of V , then φ is already true in
an inner model of V .
A core feature of the IMH is that it depends upon quantifying over
arbitrary extensions of a universe. Initially, it is thus unclear what the-
ory we should use to formalise it. It can be formulated as about count-
able transitive models20 or (using well-founded top-extensions of V )
as about infinitary logics21, or can be coded using a variant of Morse-
Kelley class theory22. Since we want to consider an axiom that is easily
formalisable across a range of possible perspectives, we shall consider
a modified version of the IMH that is formalisable in NBG:
Definition 6. (NBG) Let (V ,∈, C) be a NBG structure. The Class-Generic
Inner Model Hypothesis (or CIMH) is the claim that if a (first-order, pa-
rameter free) sentence φ holds in an inner model of a tame class forcing
extension (V [G],∈, C[G]) (where where V [G] consists of the interpreta-
tions of set-names in V usingG, and C[G] consists of the interpretations
of class-names in C using G), then φ holds in an inner model of V .
How do we know that this can be properly formalised in NBG?
Since forcing relations are definable for tame class forcings, the fol-
lowing way of expressing the CIMH is equivalent:
Definition 7. (NBG) (V ,∈, C) satisfies the Absolute Class-Generic Inner
Model Hypothesis (or CIMH) iff whenever P ⊂ V is a tame class forcing,
and φ is a parameter-free first-order sentence, then if there is a p ∈ P
such that p P “φ is true in an inner model” then φ is true in an inner
model of V .
In this way, the Class-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis can be for-
malised in NBG without quantifying directly over extensions. Even a
believer in just one maximal, universe of sets, for example, could con-
sider the CIMH as a possible axiom candidate, since presumably they
accept the use of NBG class theory.23 The question then of whether
20See here [Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013].
21See here [Antos et al., 2015], [Barton and Friedman, 2017].
22In fact, a variant of NBG+ Σ11-Comprehension is enough, see [Antos et al., F].
23A salient point here is that for any modelM = (M ,∈) |= ZFC, NBG is satisfied
by any (M ,∈,Def(M)), whereDef(M) are the definable classes ofM. A believer in
one universe of sets would thus have to reject the use of definable classes in rejecting
NBG, and would thereby give up on a large amount of standard set theory.
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the CIMH is truth-evaluable is thus not dependent upon ontological
perspective.24 Since they are formally equivalent, we will drop the dis-
tinction between the CIMH and CIMH from here on out.
1.3 Restrictiveness and large cardinals
As we will now see, the CIMH can be used to obtain theories that sug-
gest that some large cardinal axioms are restrictive. The core points
we’ll see are:
(1.) The CIMH implies the negation of large cardinal axioms, even
some of the weakest such principles.
(2.) The CIMH nonetheless validates the consistency in inner models of
large cardinals up to the level of many measurable cardinals.
(3.) The CIMH can only be interpreted in ‘impoverished’ contexts us-
ing theories incorporating large cardinals.
We deal with these points in turn. (1.) Anti-large cardinal prop-
erties of the IMH were noticed early on.25 Many results using the full
IMH can be incorporated to the current context, since they only require
tame class forcings. For instance, we can immediately identify:
Theorem. [Friedman, 2006] (NBG) If the Class-Generic Inner Model
Hypothesis holds, there are no inaccessible cardinals in V .
Given acceptance of the CIMH, this would mean that there could be
no (significant) large cardinals in V . However, the existence of large
cardinals in inner models is positively implied:
Theorem 8. [Friedman et al., 2008] (NBG) The Class-Generic Inner
Model Hypothesis implies that there is an inner model with measur-
able cardinals of arbitrarily large Mitchell order.26
Thus, while the Inner Model Hypothesis does not permit the exis-
tence of large cardinals in V , it does vindicate their existence in inner
models. By contrast, we can prove the consistency of the IMH (and
hence the CIMH) from large cardinals:
24Of course, one might worry that the natural reading of the CIMH is in terms of
quantifying over extensions, whatever the coding possibilities. See [Barton, 2019] for
discussion of this point.
25See here [Friedman, 2006], Theorem 15.
26The Mitchell ordering is a way of ordering the normal measures on a measurable
cardinal. Roughly, it corresponds to the strength of the measure, where a measure
U1 is below another U2 in the Mitchell order if U1 belongs to the ultrapower obtained
through U2. See [Jech, 2002] Ch. 19.
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Theorem 9. [Friedman et al., 2008] (ZFC) Assuming the consistency of
the existence of a Woodin cardinal with an inaccessible above, the In-
ner Model Hypothesis is consistent.
A remark about the proof will be useful for motivating our discus-
sion. For a real x, letMx be the least transitive model of ZFC containing
x. By collapsing the Woodin cardinal to ω, and using Σ12-Determinacy
and the (preserved) inaccessible in the forcing extension, one can find
a Turing degree d such that (Md,∈,Def(Md)) satisfies the IMH. The
core point to retain is the following: The IMH-satisfying structure we
find in the proof is small (in that it is countable).
We thus have a rough guide as to the consistency strength of the
Inner Model Hypothesis (somewhere between many measurables and
a Woodin with an inaccessible above). But now there is something of
a stand off between the friend of large cardinals and the supporter of
the CIMH. The friend of large cardinals looks at the supporter of the
CIMH and thinks that her theory is true in small countable transitive
models, and certainly does not hold in the universe. The supporter
of the CIMH, on the other hand, looks at the friend of large cardinals
and thinks that his theory can only be true when we leave out some
subsets that destroy the inaccessibility of particular cardinals in V . Is
there any way to resolve this stand off?
There is at least one technically precise sense in which we can say
that the CIMH-theorist is in better shape. We will use [Maddy, 1998]’s
notion of theories maximizing over one another and (and some being
restrictive on these grounds). Her idea is that one set theory T1 max-
imises over another T2 (and hence shows it to be restrictive) when one
can use T1 to provably find an interpretation of T2 in an appropriately
‘nice’ context, but not vice versa, and the two theories are jointly in-
consistent with one another. More precisely, Maddy begins with the
following definition.
Definition 10. [Maddy, 1998] A theory T shows φ is an inner model iff
there is a formula φ in one free variable such that:
(i) For all σ in ZFC, T ` σφ (i.e. σ holds relative to the φ-satisfiers).
(ii) T ` ∀αφ(α) or T ` ∃κ((“κ is inaccessible”) ∧ ∀α(α < κ → φ(α)))
(i.e. the φ-satisfiers either contain all ordinals, or all ordinals up
to some inaccessible), and
(iii) T ` ∀x∀y((x ∈ y ∧ φ(y)) → φ(x)) (i.e. φ defines a transitive
interpretation).
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This definition serves to specify the interpretations we are inter-
ested in; proper class inner models and truncations thereof at inacces-
sibles. She then defines:
Definition 11. [Maddy, 1998] φ is a fair interpretation of T1 in T2 iff:
(i) T2 shows φ is an inner model, and
(ii) For all σ in T1, T2 ` σφ.
i.e. a fair interpretation of one theory T1 in another T2 is provided by
finding some φ defining an inner model (or truncation thereof) in T2
that satisfies T1.
Maddy then goes on to define what it means for a theory to max-
imise over another. First, she thinks that there should be new isomor-
phism types outside the interpretation, which, in the presence of Foun-
dation, amounts to the existence of sets not satisfying φ:
Definition 12. [Maddy, 1998] T2 maximizes over T1 iff there is a φ such
that:
(i) φ is a fair interpretation of T1 in T2, and
(ii) T2 ` ∃x¬φ(x).
With this idea of maximisation in play, she next sets up some ad-
ditional definitions to make sure that weak but unrestrictive theories,
whilst not maximising, do not count as restrictive. This is dealt with
by the following definitions.
Definition 13. [Maddy, 1998] T2 properly maximizes over T1 iff T2 max-
imizes over T1 but not vice versa.
Definition 14. [Maddy, 1998] T2 inconsistently maximizes over T1 iff T2
properly maximises over T1 and T2 is inconsistent with T1.
Definition 15. [Maddy, 1998] T2 strongly maximizes over T1 iff T2 in-
consistently maximizes over T1, and there is no consistent T3 extend-
ing T1 that properly maximizes over T2.
Thus we have a picture on which one theory T2 (strongly) max-
imises over T1 when we can prove in T2 that a certain formula φ de-
fines a proper inner model (or truncation thereof), satisfying T1, and
such that we cannot extend T1 to a theory capable of finding such an
interpretation for T2. If there is a theory T2 strongly maximising over
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T1, then we say that T1 is Maddy-restrictive27. A natural example here is
contrasting the theories ZFC+V = L and ZFC+“There exists a measur-
able cardinal”. The latter strongly maximises over the former, since we
can always build L to find a model of ZFC + V = L, but there are no
fair interpretations with measurable cardinals under V = L (though
they can exist in other kinds of model, e.g. countable).
Maddy’s definitions are not without their problems (notably some
false negatives and positives), a fact which Maddy herself is admirably
transparent about.28 Subsequent developments of the notion have
been considered by Lo¨we and Incurvati.29 Our point here is not that
Maddy’s definitions provide the definitive word on restrictiveness, but
rather that they provide an interesting perspective on which the rough
ideas sketched earlier (concerning the stand-off) could be made pre-
cise, if one so desired.
First, the CIMH. The CIMH is formulated inNBG, and since Maddy’s
formulation is intended to apply only to first-order set theories, we
require some modification.30 It is, nonetheless, possible to prove the
following:
Proposition 16. (NBG) Let ZFCCIMH be the first-order part of
NBG + CIMH (i.e. the theory restricted to all sentences with no class
variables or parameters). Then ZFCCIMH strongly maximises over
ZFC+“There exist α-many measurables” for every α.
Proof. We first need to show that ZFCCIMH shows that some φ is an in-
ner model with α-many measurables, for any desired α (let α be fixed
from now on). Theorem 2 of [Friedman et al., 2008] establishes that
NBG+CIMH proves that there is a definable inner model with measur-
able cardinals of arbitrarily large Mitchell order.31 Thus, by going high
enough in the Mitchell order, ZFCCIMH provides a fair interpretation of
ZFC+“There exist α-many measurables”.
27We use the term ‘Maddy-restrictive’ as it is a substantial open question whether
or not Maddy-restrictive-ness and restrictiveness are coextensive.
28In the original [Maddy, 1998].
29See here [Lo¨we, 2001], [Lo¨we, 2003], and [Incurvati and Lo¨we, 2016] (which re-
sponds to some criticisms of [Hamkins, 2014]).
30A brief note on nomenclature: In set theory is usual to refer to theories that
do not have class variables as first-order, and those that do as second-order. This
is despite the fact that, strictly speaking, NBG and its cousins are two-sorted first-
order theories, even if they could be given a second-order formulation in which we
quantify into predicate position.
31Note: Friedman, Welch, and Woodin are explicit about the fact that none of their
theorems depend on arbitrary outer models, but rather could be formulated in terms
of the CIMH. See [Friedman et al., 2008] pp. 391–392.
13
Moreover ZFCCIMH also maximises over ZFC+“There exist α-many
measurables”, since there are always sets outside this interpretation.
In particular, since ZFCCIMH implies that there are no inaccessible car-
dinals, for any particular β that is measurable in our interpretation,
the interpretation misses out the sets witnessing the accessibility of β.
Clearly, the two theories are also inconsistent with one another.
It just remains to show that ZFC+“There exist α-many measur-
ables” does not maximise over ZFCCIMH (for inconsistent maximisa-
tion), nor can any consistent extension (for strong maximisation).
These are established by the following claim:
Claim 17. No consistent extension of ZFC+“There exist α-many mea-
surables” can provide a fair interpretation of ZFCCIMH.
To show this, we need to show that under any extension of
ZFC+“There exist α-many measurables”, none of (i) there is an in-
ner model of ZFCCIMH, (ii) there is a truncation at an inaccessible with
ZFCCIMH, or (iii) there is a truncation at an inaccessible of an inner
model with ZFCCIMH, are possible. For (i) it suffices to note that being
accessible is upwards absolute. Since all cardinals are accessible under
ZFCCIMH, if ZFCCIMH holds in an inner model, then all cardinals are ac-
cessible, ruling out (i). For (ii) and (iii) we first note that no truncation
Vκ for κ above the least inaccessible β can satisfy ZFCCIMH, since then
Vκ would see the inaccessibility of β. Nor can such a Vκ have an inner
model satisfying ZFCCIMH since inaccessibility is downwards absolute
and so the inner model would still see the inaccessibility of β. The
only possible case is thus when κ is the least inaccessible cardinal. If
this holds, then (Vκ,∈,P(Vκ)) |= MK and hence contains a proper class
of worldly cardinals32. However, the CIMH implies that there is a de-
finable inner model of the form L[r], where r is a real, with no worldly
cardinals (see Theorem 15 of [Friedman, 2006]). We argue for a con-
tradiction by showing (via an argument due to Joel-David Hamkins)
that worldliness is downwards absolute to models of the form L[r],
for r a real. Let α < κ be a worldly cardinal in Vκ. Since r ∈ Vα and
Vα |= ZFC, it is a standard theorem of relative constructibility33 that
(Lα[r])
Vα |= ZFC. We now just need to check that (Lα[r])Vα = (Vα)Lκ[r],
but this follows from the fact that α is a i-fixed point (a consequence of
the worldliness of α) in both Vκ and hence Lκ[r]. Thus (Vα)Lκ[r] |= ZFC
contradicting the claim that Lκ[r] contains no worldly cardinals, and
so if Vκ is inaccessible then Vκ cannot satisfy the CIMH. This deals with
(ii). For (iii) note that any inner modelM of Vκ such thatM |= ZFCCIMH
32β is worldly iff Vβ |= ZFC.
33See Theorem 13.22 on p. 192 of [Jech, 2002].
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will have to contain a model of the form Lκ[r] containing no worldly
cardinals. Since r is also in Vκ if it is in M, we can again build Lκ[r]
to obtain a Lκ[r] ⊆ Vκ with no worldly cardinals; a contradiction. This
proves Claim 17 and hence Proposition 16.34
Remark 18. The downward absoluteness of worldly cardinals to in-
ner models of the form L[r] for r a real is especially interesting for two
related reasons. First, it shows that the CIMH prohibits not just the
existence of inaccessible cardinals in V , but worldly cardinals too. Sec-
ondly, it shows that ZFCCIMH will strongly maximise over any natural
extension of ZFC of weaker consistency strength (witnessed by a fair
interpretation in ZFCCIMH) that proves “There exists a worldly cardi-
nal”.
We can thus see that the CIMH has maximising properties with re-
spect to large cardinals, and shows them to be restrictive in a precise
sense. Of course, for stronger large cardinals that are capable of prov-
ing the CIMH consistent (e.g. anything stronger than the existence of
a Woodin cardinal with an inaccessible above), it is not possible to
provide a fair interpretation of those large cardinals within ZFCCIMH
alone, and so neither strongly maximizes over the other. However,
if we were to augment our theory of NBG + CIMH (somewhat artifi-
cially) with the claim that there is a first-order definable inner model
of ZFC with the relevant large cardinals, then parallel reasoning yields
the same restrictiveness result. One could do this, for example, by
asserting the existence of mice; small structures that allow us to con-
struct inner models for large cardinals by iterated ultrapowers. If we
have a mouse N whose iterated ultrapower generates an inner model
of M |= φ for some large cardinal φ, the first-order part of the theory
NBG+CIMH+“N exists” will strongly maximise over ZFC+ φ as before,
assuming that the existence of the relevant mouse is consistent with
the CIMH. There some limitations here since; (i) the CIMH implies that
the reals are not closed under ] and PD is false,35 and (ii) for every n
the existence of mice generating n-many Woodin cardinals is equiv-
alent to PD. We thus cannot go as far as ω-many Woodin cardinals
using this tactic. These complications aside, for many large cardinals
the restrictiveness result does hold, and we’ll return to these issues in
§3.
34I am grateful to Kameryn Williams and Victoria Gitman for some useful discus-
sions concerning this proof.
35This also holds in virtue of Theorem 15 in [Friedman, 2006].
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2 The Absoluteness Conception of Maximal-
ity
We have reached a point where:
(1.) We have seen that there are axioms (e.g. CIMH) that have anti-large
cardinal properties.
(2.) There is an apparent standoff: From the perspective of the ad-
vocate of large cardinals the CIMH appears to consider only very
small transitive models, and from the perspective of the supporter
of the CIMH, the truth of large cardinal axioms requires missing
out subsets that witness accessibility and/or non-worldliness.
(3.) If we analyse this debate in terms of Maddy’s notion of restrictive-
ness, it is the large cardinal axioms, at least up to the level of many
measurable cardinals, that appear restrictive.
We are thus at a point where large cardinals are viewed as restric-
tive given theories based on the CIMH. However, it is one thing to pro-
vide an axiom for which the restrictiveness results hold, and another
to argue that said axiom is a reasonable one. Maddy herself is aware
that her notion of restrictiveness delivers far too many false-positives
when ‘dud’ theories are considered. So, is the CIMH (and the first-order
theory it generates) a ‘dud’? In this section I argue that the CIMH can
be motivated along similar lines to bounded forcing axioms via con-
siderations of the richness of the subset forming operation. In seeing
this we shall use the idea of absoluteness (in width) which is appealed
to by both the friend of bounded forcing axioms and the supporter of
the CIMH. We’ll see though that these are calibrated in very different
ways.
One can formulate a general template for a width-absoluteness
principle as follows:
Width Absoluteness Principles. Let Γ be a class of sentences in some
appropriate logic. If φ ∈ Γ is true in some appropriate extension of V
with the same ordinals (i.e. a width extension) then φ is already realised
in some appropriate structure contained in V .
Clearly the idea of a width absoluteness principle is schematically
formulated, and the content a width absoluteness principle has will be
relative to the logical resources, extensions, and internal structures al-
lowed. Some precedents exist for justification of axioms by this means.
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Bounded forcing axioms are a good example here. To facilitate under-
standing of the ideas later in this section, we first provide a very coarse
and intuitive sketch of the forcing technique.
Forcing, loosely speaking, is a way of adding subsets of sets to cer-
tain kinds of model. For some model M and atomless partial order
P ∈ M, we (via ways of naming possible sets and evaluating these
names) add a set G that intersects every dense set of P in M.36 The
resulting model (often denoted by ‘M[G]’), can be thought of as the
smallest object one gets when one adds G to M and closes under the
operations definable inM.
A forcing axiom expresses the claim that the universe has been sat-
urated under forcing for certain kinds of partial order and families of
dense sets. For example we have the following axiom:
Definition. Let κ be an infinite cardinal. MA(κ) is the statement that
for any forcing poset P in which all antichains are countable (i.e. P has
the countable chain condition), and any family of dense sets D such
that |D| ≤ κ, there is a filter G on P such that if D ∈ D is a dense subset
of P, then G ∩D 6= ∅.
Definition. Martin’s Axiom (or just MA) is the statement that for every
κ smaller than the cardinality of the continuum, MA(κ) holds.
One can think of Martin’s axiom in the following way: The uni-
verse has been saturated under forcing for all posets with a certain
chain condition and less-than-continuum-sized families of dense sets.
There are several kinds of forcing axiom, each corresponding to dif-
ferent permissions on the kind of forcing poset allowed (the countable
chain condition is quite a restrictive requirement). Many of these have
interesting consequences for the study of independence, notably many
(e.g. the Proper Forcing Axiom) imply that CH is false and that in fact
2ℵ0 = ℵ2.
It is, however, unclear exactly why we should accept forcing ax-
ioms. As it stands, though they seem to correspond to some rough
idea of ‘saturating’ under forcing, they are nonetheless combinato-
rially characterised principles, and it is not clear if this idea can be
cashed out in more foundational terms.37
36A subtle philosophical and technical question is exactly which models are ex-
tendible in width (e.g. must the model be countable?) and how we should under-
stand the metamathematics of this practice, given different ontological outlooks. See
[Barton, 2019] for discussion.
37There are those that think that forcing axioms are well-justified just on the basis
of the saturation idea. Magidor, for example, argues:
Forcing axioms like Martin’s Axiom (MA), the Proper Forcing Axiom
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One idea is to capture some of the content of forcing axioms by as-
similating them under principles of width absoluteness. This project
has been developed by Bagaria who provides the following character-
isations of bounded forcing axioms:
Definition. [Bagaria, 1997] (ZFC) Absolute-MA. We say that V satis-
fies Absolute-MA iff whenever V [G] is a generic extension of V by a
partial order P with the countable chain condition in V , and φ(x) is a
Σ1(P(ω1)) formula (i.e. a first-order formula containing only param-
eters from P(ω1)), if V [G] |= ∃xφ(x) then there is a y in V such that
φ(y).
and we can characterise the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom (BPFA) as
follows:
Definition. [Bagaria, 2000] (ZFC) Absolute-BPFA. We say that V sat-
isfies Absolute-BPFA iff whenever φ is a Σ1 sentence with parameters
from H(ω2), if φ holds a forcing extension V [G] obtained by proper
forcing, then φ holds in V .
and Bounded Martin’s Maximum (BMM):
Definition. [Bagaria, 2000] (ZFC) Absolute-BMM. We say that V sat-
isfies Absolute-BMM iff whenever φ is a Σ1 sentence with parameters
from H(ω2), if φ holds a forcing extension V [G] obtained by a forcing
P that preserves stationary subsets of ω1, then φ holds in V .
Each of these axioms shows how one can encapsulate bounded
forcing axioms using absoluteness principles. One might think that
this provides evidence for their truth, or at least their naturalness:
In the case of MA and some weaker forms of PFA and MM,
some justification for their being taken as true axioms is
(PFA), Martin’s Maximum (MM) and other variations were very suc-
cessful in settling many independent problems. The intuitive motiva-
tion for all of them is that the universe of sets is as rich as possible, or
at the slogan level: A set [whose] existence is possible and there is no
clear obstruction to its existence [exists]...
...What do we mean by “possible”? I think that a good approximation
is “can be forced to [exist]”... I consider forcing axioms as an attempt to
try and get a consistent approximation to the above intuitive principle
by restricting the properties we talk about and the the forcing exten-
sions we use. ([Magidor, U], pp. 15–16)
Magidor is clear that the idea is rough, and sees forcing axioms as a way of making
this precise. However, it seems that his motivations apply equally well to the idea of
width absoluteness, which is the focus of this paper.
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based on the fact that they are equivalent to principles of
generic absoluteness. That is, they assert, under certain
restrictions that are necessary to avoid inconsistency, that
everything that might exist, does exist. More precisely, if
some set having certain properties could be forced to exist
over V , then a set having the same properties already exists
(in V ). ([Bagaria, 2008], pp. 319–320)
These formulations and remarks make it particularly perspicuous
the sense in which some bounded forcing axioms can be thought of as
maximising the universe under ‘possible’ sets; if we could force there
to be a set of kind φ (for a particular kind of φ and P), one already exists
in V .38 There is a clear sense in which such an intuition corresponds
to a natural idea about mathematics: If it is possible to have an object
such that φ, then there actually is such an object since mathematics
should not be constrained by the limits of what is actual rather than
possible.
Importantly for us, the CIMH is clearly a kind of width absoluteness
principle, asserting that anything true in an inner model of an outer
model is already true in an inner model of V . Moreover, it conforms
to criteria laid out by Bagaria (in [Bagaria, 2005]) on what it is to be a
natural axiom of set theory. His criteria (which he calls meta-axioms of
set theory) he terms Consistency, Maximality, and Fairness.39 We look at
each of them in turn. First:
(Consistency) The new axiom should be consistent with ZFC.
By the results of [Friedman et al., 2008], if the existence of a Woodin
cardinal with an inaccessible above is consistent, then the CIMH is con-
sistent. Thus, the CIMH passes this test if certain large cardinal axioms
are consistent.
Secondly we have:
(Maximality) The more sets the axiom asserts to exist, the better.
38For some discussion of the coding of Absolute-MA (and similar principles) for
the philosopher inclined towards a “universist” picture of set-theoretic ontology see
[Barton, 2019] and [Antos et al., F]. .
39He also mentions the criterion of Success for evaluating axioms determined to be
natural on the basis of Consistency, Maximality, and Fairness. I won’t discuss this
here since (a) I have reservations about how we assess the ‘success’ of an axiom (see
[Barton et al., S]), and (b) at this stage, we’re just assessing whether or not theCIMH is
a ‘dud’ for the purposes of the restrictiveness argument, and arguing that is natural is
presumably sufficient for showing non-dud-ness. In any case, the CIMH has several
interesting consequences, and provides a cohesive (if controversial) perspective on
the nature of V , and so is successful in some sense.
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Bagaria acknowledges that this criteria is somewhat vague, and
makes it precise as follows:
To attain a more concrete and useful form of the Maximal-
ity criterion it will be convenient to think about maximality
in terms of models. Namely, suppose V is the universe of
all sets as given by ZFC, and think of V as being properly
contained in an ideal larger universe W which also satis-
fies ZFC and contains, of course, some sets that do not be-
long to V—and it may even contain V itself as a set—and
whose existence, therefore, cannot be proved in ZFC alone.
Now the new axiom should imply that some of those sets
existing in W already exist in V , i.e., that some existential
statements that hold in W hold also in V . [Bagaria, 2005]
Bagaria thus holds that we should cash out maximality precisely in
terms of a form of Width Absoluteness, asserting that existential sen-
tences true in extensions are already true in V . As Bagaria notes, one
cannot have such a principle without some restriction, since both CH
and¬CH can both be formulated as existential sentences; the former by
postulating the existence of sets of reals and the latter by asserting that
functions exist between P(ω) and subsets thereof. In order to maintain
consistency, Bagaria recommends a restriction to Σ1-sentences.
Whilst the CIMH is not exactly of this form, it is close, and instead
of restricting to Σ1-sentences, we obtain (probable) consistency by as-
serting that sentences that are realisable in tame class forcing extension
are already realised in inner models of V . Moreover, if we allow pred-
icative second-order quantification there are existential formulations
of the CIMH that do have a formulation in terms of Σ11-sentences. For
example we can characterise the CIMH using the following definition:
Definition 19. (NBG) A formula is persistent-Σ11 iff it is of the following
form:
(∃M)(“M is a transitive class”∧M |= ψ)
where ψ is first-order.
Definition 20. (NBG) Tame parameter-free persistent Σ11-absoluteness is the
claim that if φ is persistent-Σ11 and true in a tame class-generic exten-
sion of V , then φ is true in V .
Theorem 21. [Friedman, 2006] (NBG) The CIMH is equivalent to tame
parameter-free persistent Σ11-absoluteness.
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In this way, we can view the CIMH as a generalisation of the follow-
ing theorem of ZFC (as [Friedman, 2006] notes):
Theorem 22. (ZFC) Parameter-Free Le´vy-Shoenfield Absoluteness. Let φ
be a parameter-free Σ1-sentence. If φ is true in an outer model of V ,
then φ is true in V .
Thus the CIMH can be thought of as a principle along the lines that
Bagaria suggests—asserting that anything (of a particular kind) that
‘could’ have existed already has a witness. Moreover, it does so by
generalising an idea already present in ZFC. In this respect, it resem-
bles a reflection principle for height: A standard principle of absolute-
ness true in ZFC is generalised to a language of higher-order.40
Bagaria’s third condition concerns how maximality through abso-
luteness is applied. Given that there are no a priori reasons for accept-
ing one existential statement true in some extension over another, we
should accept all statements of the same complexity. This motivates
the following criterion:
(Fairness) One should not discriminate against sentences of the same
logical complexity and (where parameters are concerned) one should
not discriminate against sets of the same complexity.
I contend that the CIMH also satisfies the Fairness condition, or at
least comes very close. Since the CIMH does not allow the use of pa-
rameters, the constraint to not discriminate against different param-
eters is vacuously satisfied.41 Concerning the discrimination against
sentences, the usual version of the CIMH concerns sentences of arbi-
trary complexity, and so does not discriminate on these grounds.
Of course one might then object that the usual version of the CIMH,
whilst it does not discriminate in terms of Fairness, does do so in terms
of Maximality, as formulated by Bagaria, since it reflects truth in outer
models to inner model of V , not V itself. On the other hand, the for-
mulation of the CIMH in terms of tame parameter-free persistent Σ11-
absoluteness, whilst it does not discriminate on the basis of Maximal-
ity (since it reflects directly to truth in V ), does discriminate on the
basis of only reflecting the persistent Σ11-sentences, rather than all of
them.
40See [Barton et al., 2020] for an examination of other width reflection principles,
and some explanations of the differences between height and width reflection.
41The use of parameters in the CIMH is prohibited because one could quickly col-
lapse ω1 in an inner model and hence in V , contradicting ZFC. Nonetheless, there
are variants of the IMH that consider the careful introduction of parameters, such as
the Strong Inner Model Hypothesis, see [Friedman, 2006].
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I think there are a couple of responses here. The first point to bear
in mind is that the current dialectical situation is trying to determine
whether or not the CIMH is a dud, in order to run the restrictiveness
argument. In this context, we might think that even if the CIMH does
not exactly satisfy Bagaria’s requirements, it does come desperately
close, and this is perhaps sufficient for it to clear the bar of non-dud-
ness. However, we might also point out that there are other respects in
which the CIMH is less discriminatory than bounded forcing axioms. In
particular, all the bounded forcing axioms that Bagaria considers dis-
criminate against tame class forcing extensions, and we might think
that fairness in the kind of extension considered is a requirement over-
looked by Bagaria. In this way the CIMH incorporates a more liberal
and less discriminatory account of possibility than its bounded (dis-
tant) cousins.42
I thus think that the CIMH is minimally in the running as a con-
tender for an axiom, albeit a controversial one, at least insofar as
one accepts NBG class theory. Of course one could reject the use
of NBG, but this strikes me as an overly harsh restriction (though
[Bagaria, 2005] is keen to make sure all axioms are first-order). For
the sake of argument, let us assume from this point on that the CIMH
is a natural enough axiom of set theory that can be motivated along
similar lines to bounded forcing axioms.
Immediately though, we run into an apparent problem. Given that
both the CIMH and bounded forcing axioms represent natural axioms
of set theory, we may wish to use them in tandem. However, this is
not possible:
Proposition 23. (NBG) The CIMH is inconsistent with the BPFA (and
hence BMM).
Proof. Say that a cardinal κ is reflecting iff κ is regular and Vκ Σ2 V .
[Goldstern and Shelah, 1995] showed that over ZFC, BPFA implies that
ωV2 is reflecting in L, and their arguments hold for any model of the
form L[x] where x is a real. Thus, under BPFA, any inner model of
42As I have argued elsewhere (with Carolin Antos and Sy-David Friedman in
[Antos et al., F]) we might think that set-forcing is a relatively mild kind of exten-
sion. Bukovsky’s Theorem (in [Bukovsky´, 1973]) states that ifM an inner model of
N definable inN, and κ a regular uncountable cardinal inM, thenM κ-globally cov-
ers N if and only if N is a κ-c.c. set-generic extension ofM. We might think that this
theorem suggests that set-forcing is relatively mild, since if one model is a set forcing
extension of another (by some κ-c.c. forcing), then every function in the extension is
already κ-covered by some function in the ground model, which stands in contrast
to class forcing (though, whether there could be an analogue for class forcing is still
open). See [Friedman et al., F] for further discussion of the Bukovsky Theorem.
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the form L[x] contains a reflecting cardinal (and hence an inaccessi-
ble) namely ωV2 . This straightforwardly contradicts the claim that the
CIMH implies that there is a model of the form L[x] that contains no
inaccessibles.
What is going on here? The key issue is that any width absolute-
ness principle depends on a careful calibration between the following
factors:43
(1.) What extensions you consider for width absoluteness (e.g. set
forcing extensions, tame class forcing extensions, arbitrary exten-
sions).
(2.) What complexity of sentences you reflect, and in what language.
(3.) What parameters you allow in the sentences to be reflected.
(4.) Where we reflect the sentences (e.g. to V , to an inner model
M ⊆ V , to a structure of the form Hκ, etc.).
The problem is that over-generalisation across different areas will
result in inconsistency. It is obvious, for instance, that allowing arbi-
trary parameters and arbitrary set forcing extensions is immediately
inconsistent by collapsing ω1. Or that having Σ2-sentences reflected to
V is inconsistent (since both CH and ¬CH are Σ2). More generally, we
know that no two transitive modelsM and N with the same ordinals
can be fully Σ1-elementary (with parameters) in one another, since
˜
Σ1-
43I am grateful to Matteo Viale for discussion of the nature of the calibration of
width absoluteness principles. Whilst a full discussion of the whole space of pos-
sibilities for absoluteness principles is outside the scope of this article, some alter-
natives deserve mentioning. [Bagaria, 2006] provides a detailed survey of how the
various variables of principles of generic absoluteness can be tweaked to yield dif-
ferent results, and how the consequences of the absoluteness principles depend on
the ambient properties of the model. In this vein, Viale has provided a fine-grained
analysis of various forcing axioms including (a) how Martin’s Maximum can be
strengthened and how this relates to category forcings, (b) how many forcing ax-
ioms can be characterised as principles of resurrection (c) how many principles of
set theory such as AC, Łos´’ Theorem, and some large cardinals, can be characterised
as forcing axioms, and (c) how these results are able to yield the kind of absoluteness
suggested as desirable by Bagaria. See [Viale, 2016], [Viale, 2016a], [Viale, 2016b] for
these results. A different approach is suggested by [Venturi, 2020] and taken up by
[Venturi and Viale, 2019] and [Viale, 2020]; to use Robinson infinite forcing in com-
bination with an analysis of model completion and model companionship in charac-
terising absoluteness properties.
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elementarity entails that V Mα = V Nα for every α.44 Combining the BPFA
with the CIMH is, unfortunately, asking for too much; the absoluteness
given by BPFA produces large cardinals in all models of the form L[x],
but the absoluteness given by the CIMH kills large cardinals in at least
one such model.
Is there a way to break the deadlock? Again, using Maddy-
restrictiveness, we can make some progress:
Proposition 24. (NBG) The CIMH strongly maximizes over the BPFA,
in the sense that ZFCCIMH strongly maximizes over ZFC+ BPFA.
Proof. We first need to show that ZFCCIMH can provide a fair interpre-
tation of ZFC+BPFA (this will immediately give us the maximzation
of ZFCCIMH over ZFC+BPFA since they are mutually inconsistent). As
ZFCCIMH implies the existence of 0], within L we have a reflecting car-
dinal κ (i.e. a regular cardinal such that Vκ Σ2 V , and in this case an
L-regular cardinal such that V Lκ 4Σ2 L). [Goldstern and Shelah, 1995]
showed that if κ is reflecting, then there is a proper forcing iteration
P ⊆ Vκ of length κ forcing BPFA. There is then, within V , and L-
generic G for the Goldstern-Shelah forcing over L, and L[G] is then an
inner model (and hence fair interpretation) of ZFC+BPFA in ZFCCIMH.
Since BPFA is inconsistent with ZFCCIMH, we get maximization imme-
diately, and inconsistent maximization if we can show that ZFC+BPFA
does not maximize over ZFCCIMH.
We prove this by showing that ZFC+BPFA cannot provide a fair
interpretation of ZFCCIMH. By [Goldstern and Shelah, 1995], we know
that over ZFC, BPFA implies that ωV2 is reflecting in L, and their argu-
ments hold for any model of the form L[x] where x is a real. Thus,
under BPFA, any inner model of the form L[x] contains an inaccessible
(and hence a reflecting cardinal) namely ωV2 . This straightforwardly
contradicts the claim that the CIMH implies that there is a model of
the form L[x] that contains no inaccessibles, and the L[x] of any in-
ner model (possibly satisfying the CIMH) is also the L[x] of V (by the
absoluteness of the construction of L[x]). Clearly, truncation at an in-
accessible leaves the argument unaffected.
For exactly this reason, no consistent extension of ZFC+BPFA can
maximise over ZFCCIMH, since any extension of ZFC+BPFA proves that
every model of the form L[x] contains a reflecting cardinal, by the
BPFA alone. We therefore get the strong maximization of ZFCCIMH over
ZFC+BPFA for free.
44These points, as well as some other easy impossibility results, are made by
[Bagaria, 2006], §3. For a proof of the folklore result that
˜
Σ1-elementarity en-
tails identity for transitive models with the same ordinals, see Observation 2.4 of
[Barton et al., 2020].
24
Thus, despite the inconsistency between the CIMH and BPFA, the
CIMH appears appears to Maddy-maximize over the BPFA. Does the
CIMH strongly maximize over BMM? The following theorem indicates
that it does not:
Theorem. [Schindler, 2006] (ZFC) BMM implies that for every set X
there is an inner model with a strong cardinal containing X .
BMM thus has greater consistency strength than the CIMH, and so
the CIMH cannot maximize over BMM. However, the fact that the CIMH
implies the existence of a model of the form L[x] with no worldly car-
dinals has ramifications for interactions with BMM and other generic
absoluteness principles (such as those mentioned above). We can im-
mediately identify:
Proposition 25. No theory T that implies that there is an inaccessible
(or even worldly) cardinal in L[x] for every real x can ever maximise
over ZFCCIMH. Hence, if we extend ZFCCIMH to a consistent extension
ZFCCIMH∗ that proves the existence of a definable inner model for T,
ZFCCIMH∗ will strongly maximize over T.
Proof. By assumption, any such ZFCCIMH∗ inconsistently maximizes
over T. But also by assumption, no consistent extension of T can find
a fair interpretation of ZFCCIMH∗ (exactly as in Proposition 24), and so
we have strong maximization.
Since BMM is exactly one such T, if we find a reasonable extension
of ZFCCIMH (or, just cheat by adding the axiom to NBG + CIMH that
there is a definable inner model for BMM) then such an extension will
strongly maximize over ZFC+ BMM.
Thus, whilst the CIMH is inconsistent with other width absolute-
ness principles, it is the other putative axioms that seem restrictive.
Moreover, it is the fact that the CIMH has such strong anti-large car-
dinal properties (prohibiting even principles that imply that all inner
models of the form L[x] for x a real have large cardinals) that gives it
these maximisation properties.
3 Foundational roles of large cardinal axioms
under the CIMH
We are now in a position where:
(a) We have seen that there is a principle, namely the CIMH, that, if
true, implies that large cardinal axioms are restrictive (both intu-
itively and in Maddy’s sense of restrictiveness).
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(b) The CIMH can be motivated along lines similar to other principles
of absoluteness such as bounded forcing axioms.
(c) Though the CIMH is inconsistent with many of these principles, the
CIMH maximizes over some of them, and has prospects for max-
imising over others if extended.
We thus seem to have a legitimate perspective on set theory on
which large cardinal axioms are false and restrictive, but consistent.
Earlier however (§1.1) we identified the following features of large car-
dinals:
(1.) Large cardinals appear to be linearly ordered by consistency
strength (and hence are the standard indices of consistency
strength).
(2.) They are used to interpret theories in ‘natural’ contexts (i.e. they
maximise interpretive power).
(3.) They are used in various technical model-building constructions
in inner model theory.
(4.) They can be used to prove axioms of definable determinacy.
(5.) They are often regarded as species of ‘maximality’ axiom.
Our previous arguments put pressure on (5.): There are set-
theoretic frameworks on which large cardinal axioms, far from being
maximality axioms, are in fact restrictive. In this section, we’ll argue
that nonetheless large cardinal axioms can still fulfil roles (1.)–(3.), and
(4.) remains open.
Point (1.) can be dealt with very quickly. In order to study the
consistency strengths of mathematical theories, we only require that
the theories be true in some model or other, not necessarily in V . More
generally, there are the following ‘levels’ for where an axiom Φ can be
true:
(i) Φ could be true in V .
(ii) Φ could be true in an inner model.
(iii) Φ could be true in a transitive model.
(iv) Φ could be true in a countable transitive model.
(v) Φ could be true in some model (whatever it may be).
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For consistency statements, any model will do, and so any of (i)–(v)
are acceptable places for considering Φ. There is no obstacle to having
any of (ii)–(v) for the friend of the CIMH (or any other anti-large car-
dinal principle). Indeed they may well want to accept the consistency
(in some model or other) of ZFC+“There is a Woodin cardinal with an
inaccessible above”, since this allows them to prove their theory con-
sistent. There is no incoherence here; it is just that for the friend of the
CIMH, large cardinal ‘axioms’ form a body of false but useful princi-
ples.
Point (2.) can also be dealt with reasonably easily. In order to
maximise interpretive power we just need some appropriately ‘nice’
or ‘standard’ (e.g. well-founded, containing all ordinals) place where
the relevant mathematics can be developed. But our earlier observa-
tions concerning the maximizing properties of the CIMH show that we
can perfectly well have large cardinals in inner models, and indeed
this is positively implied for many large cardinals.45 Thus there is not
necessarily any loss of interpretive power; we can always assert (and
often prove) that large cardinals exist in inner models, even if not in V .
Thus any interpretability work that could be done using a large cardi-
nal axiom can be done in an inner model, without requiring that the
axiom be true.
Since they are interrelated, let’s examine (3.) (model-building) and
(4.) (the case for axioms of definable determinacy) in tandem. For
(3.) we should begin by noting that there are a wide variety of model
building enterprises that set theorists engage in. In many cases, we
try to build models that are L-like in that we can determine a rich
variety of their properties (e.g. satisfying the GCH), but also satisfy
some large cardinal axiom. Often such models are of the form L[E]
where E is a set or a class, and in this vein we can consider L[∅] = L
(the vanilla constructible hierarchy), L[M] (where M is the class of
all mice—this is the Dodd-Jensen core model), L[U ] (where U is an
ultrafilter on the least measurable cardinal), L[U ] (where U is a proper
class of ultrafilters; one for each measurable cardinal), and so on.46
For many of these models we can simply build them in V , exactly as
from the perspective of the large cardinal theorist. For example we can
construct L as normal, and since the CIMH implies the existence of 0]
we can build L[0]] too.
There are, however, some limitations here. The CIMH implies that
the reals are not closed under ], and so there is some real x for which
x] (and hence L[x]]) does not exist. However, in these cases we can
45[Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013] also make this point.
46See [Mitchell, 2010] for an outline of inner model theory.
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(if we so desire) interpret the construction as conducted within an in-
ner model on which the reals are closed under sharp. This possibility
shows how one can interpret a construction as building a smaller inner
model within a proper inner model of V with the required properties.47
Within this perspective all the usual technical work can be carried out
(such as comparing different ultrapower iterations and so on). In this
respect, there is still a place to interpret inner model theory in a natural
way.
However, there is a sense then in which the CIMH provides a dif-
ferent picture of the kinds of L-like model that can be built from reals
compared to the large cardinal theorist. For the large cardinal theo-
rist there is often a unique real corresponding to the mouse/mice from
which we want to build the model. For the friend of the CIMH the real
we choose will only have its properties relative to a perspective pro-
vided by a proper inner model, and so there is not in general a unique
real corresponding to the building of some L-like model.48 Whether
or not this is merely a matter of taste or represents an objection is a
question about which I remain agnostic.
For some philosophical applications of inner model theory, how-
ever, this difference in how models relate to reals is immaterial. For
example, one philosophical application of the existence of L-like mod-
els is given by John Steel who writes:
Canonical inner models admit a systematic, detailed, “fine
structure theory” much like Jensen’s theory of L. Such a
thorough and detailed description of what a universe sat-
isfying H might look like provides evidence that H [a large
cardinal axiom] is indeed consistent, for a voluble witness
with an inconsistent story is more likely to contradict him-
self than a reticent one. ([Steel, 2014], p. 156)
Steel’s point is the following. Given a large cardinal axiom H , we
might (rightly) be concerned about its consistency. However, if we can
construct an L-like inner modelMH with the requisite structure theory
(often this is founded on some form of condensation) then we have
a huge amount of information about MH , for example such models
usually satisfy the GCH and versions of principles like ♦ and . This
should give us confidence that H is consistent, since we know that if
H is consistent then it is also consistent with the GCH etc. (and indeed
anything that can be forced overMH whilst preserving H). We might,
47This point is also made by [Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013].
48Though see below for some possible modifications to the CIMH that might avoid
this feature.
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therefore, expect any inconsistency encoded by H to turn up in one of
these models (which would imply the inconsistency of H by modus
tollens), and since we have not discovered any inconsistency in the in-
ner model we can be more confident that H is indeed consistent. This
contrasts with those large cardinals for which we do not yet have an
inner model theory, since we do not have such information-rich con-
texts in which to examine them. We can now simply note that Steel’s
argument does not depend on there being a unique real in any way, it
is enough for his argument to work that there is some information-rich
context(s) in which H is satisfied, and these models can perfectly well
all be constructed within different proper inner models.
The discussion of inner models immediately brings us on to (4.) the
case for axioms of definable determinacy. Whilst it is not the case that
a principle having anti-large cardinal features immediately disqualifies
the justificatory case for PD found in the literature, we will see that
there are again limitations when it comes to the CIMH.
Anti-large cardinal frameworks can incorporate axioms of defin-
able determinacy because they do not require the literal truth of large
cardinal axioms, but rather only the truth of the large cardinals axioms
in inner models. Generally speaking this is where there are equiva-
lences (rather than strict implications from the large cardinals to ax-
ioms of definable determinacy). For example49:
Theorem. (Woodin) The following are equivalent:
(a) Projective Determinacy (schematically rendered).
(b) For every n < ω, there is a fine-structural, countably iterable inner
modelM such thatM |= “There are n Woodin cardinals”.
Thus it may very well be the case that PD holds, there are plenty of
Woodin cardinals in inner models, but no actual Woodin cardinals in
V . More must be done to argue why the existence of such models must
be explained by truth of the large cardinals, rather than the apparent
consistency of the practice.50
49For a list see [Koellner, 2011].
50This is perhaps what lies behind the following idea of Woodin:
“A Set Theorist’s Cosmological Principle: The large cardinal axioms
for which there is an inner model theory are consistent; the correspond-
ing predictions of unsolvability are true because the axioms are true.”
([Woodin, 2011], p. 458)
Woodin’s idea is that on the basis of consistency statements, we can make predic-
tions. For example, “There will be no discovery of an inconsistency in the theory
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Nonetheless, for the specific case of the CIMH (rather than anti-large
cardinal principles in general), we have some limitations. This is due
to the fact that the CIMH implies that PD is false outright, because (as
noted above) the CIMH implies that it is not the case that for every real
x, x] exists and boldface (i.e. with parameters)
˜
Π11-determinacy fails.
In spite of this, we do have some definable determinacy; the CIMH is
consistent with (and in fact implies) lightface (i.e. parameter-free) Π11-
determinacy.51 Moreover, it is open whether there could be CIMH-like
principles with some anti-large cardinal features that are nonetheless
consistent with strong axioms of definable determinacy like PD.
For example, suppose that one is moved by justifications for
Woodin cardinals and adopts ZFC+“There is a proper class of Woodin
cardinals” as one’s canonical theory of sets and one is not prepared
to give up on this theory in the face of our earlier observations about
restrictiveness. Suppose further that one holds that some CIMH-like
principle should hold on the basis of absoluteness considerations. We
might then formulate the following principle:
Definition 26. (NBG) Let (V ,∈, C) be a NBG structure containing a
proper class of Woodin cardinals. The Class-Generic Inner Model Hy-
pothesis for Woodins CIMHW states that if a (first-order, parameter
free) sentence φ holds in an inner model of a tame class forcing ex-
tension (V [G],∈, C[G]) containing a proper class of Woodin cardinals,
then φ holds in an inner model of V .
Assuming this axiom is consistent, we would have a version of the
CIMH that is consistent with PD (since a proper class of Woodin car-
dinals implies PD), and the CIMHW trivially implies that there is such
a class. The CIMHW might still have some anti-large cardinal features
though. The usual ways of killing large cardinals under the CIMH in-
volve moving to an outer model of the form L[x] such that L[x] |= ZFC,
but every level Lα[x] violates ZFC. Assuming then that the existence
of a proper class of Woodin cardinals can be given an inner model
theory (i.e. there is a model of the form L[E] with sufficient fine struc-
ture such that L[E] |= “There is a proper class of Woodin cardinals”),
the results of [Friedman, 2006] (in particular Theorem 15) might well
then be generalised to show that over the base theory ZFC+“There is
a proper class of Woodin cardinals”, the Inner Model Hypothesis for
ZFC+“There is a Woodin cardinal” in the next 10’000 years” is a prediction ratified
by the truth of the theory ZFC+“There is a proper class of Woodin cardinals”. I see
no reason why this prediction should be explained by the truth of the large cardinal
axiom rather than its consistency (possibly in an inner model).
51See [Friedman, 2018], p. 91.
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Woodins implies that there is no inaccessible limit of Woodin cardinals
in V in the presence of PD. The details appear difficult, especially since
the construction of these inner models is complex, and so we leave the
question open in the conclusion. However, if consistent, we might
thereby obtain an axiom with some anti-large cardinal properties, but
nonetheless consistent with stronger axioms of definable determinacy.
4 Open questions and concluding remarks
In this paper I have argued that:
(1.) There is natural set-theoretic principle of absoluteness (the CIMH)
on which large cardinal axioms appear restrictive, and this can be
further made precise by appealing to Maddy’s notion of restric-
tiveness.
(2.) Large cardinals can still play many of their usual foundational
roles on this framework, despite their falsity. Nonetheless, there
are some specific questions about how much definable determi-
nacy is desirable.
I’ll close with a few philosophical upshots and directions for future
research.
Tension with ‘height’ absoluteness. Throughout this paper we’ve
been considering principles of absoluteness (e.g. BPFA, CIMH) that are
‘width-like’ in the sense that they consider what is absolute between
the universe and some extension of the universe with the same or-
dinals but different subsets. In this way, the rough motivation is to
make V as ‘wide’ as possible by ensuring that witnesses for certain
claims true in extensions exist. These contrast with ‘height’ absolute-
ness principles (often called ‘reflection principles’) that assert that sen-
tences satisfied by the universe are satisfied (suitably relativised) by
substructures thereof (usually some Vα). But even second-order height
absoluteness (i.e. the claim that if φ(A) holds then there is a Vα such
that (Vα,∈,A∩Vα) |= φVα(A) ) implies the existence of inaccessible car-
dinals. This shows that there is a tension between height and width
absoluteness; one cannot have both in full generality.52
52This is especially interesting since certain other kinds of width-absoluteness
principles—such as Woodin’s results concerning the absoluteness of Th(L(R)) or the
Inner Model Reflection Principles of [Barton et al., 2020]—are positively implied by
large cardinal axioms.
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At this point, we might wonder if there are natural weakenings
of the CIMH that yield a greater degree of consistency with large cardi-
nals, thereby incorporating the best of both worlds. Some have already
been considered, for example [Friedman, 2016] considers the IMH], a
principle combining the IMH with a certain amount of reflection from
height extensions. For stronger large cardinals, however, the question
is still open. In this direction we recall questions raised by earlier dis-
cussion:
Questions. Is the CIMHW consistent? If so, does it have substantial
anti-large cardinal consequences?
Answering these questions positively would not only provide us
with a width absoluteness principle consistent with many large car-
dinals but destroying others, but would also provide a version of the
CIMH consistent with axioms of definable determinacy.
Connection to the iterative conception of set. One might instead
push back on the claim that we should be trying to incorporate height
absoluteness at all at the expense of width absoluteness. Whilst we
have mostly concerned ourselves with the idea of restrictiveness, an ar-
gument in favour of width absoluteness as privileged as compared to
height absoluteness can be obtained by considering the iterative con-
ception of set. This tells us to:
1. Take all possible sets at successor stages.
2. Continue this process for as long as possible.
If one thinks then that the CIMH is a good measure of taking all sub-
sets at successor stages, we might simply say that it is not possible to
take all subsets at successor stages and iterate the stages far enough to
satisfy strong height reflection principles or large cardinal axioms. In
this sense, width absoluteness is privileged in relation to height abso-
luteness and/or large cardinal existence.53
53An analogous argument that appeared in an ancestor of this paper ([Barton, U])
runs as follows: What would happen if we gained good evidence of the consistency
of Reinhardt cardinals (and other choiceless cardinals) with ZF? Should we accept
that AC is limitative and ‘prevents’ Reinhardt cardinals from being formed? There
I argued no: The Axiom of Choice is well-motivated on the basis of the iterative
conception and the idea of taking all subsets at previous stages, and the conclusion
should be that the hypothetical consistency of a choiceless cardinal is witnessed by
leaving out choice sets somehow (either in a proper inner model, or if the consistency
is witnessed by a forcing extension then in a countable transitive model).
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Should we repudiate large cardinals on this basis as definitively
false? I want to emphasise that this is not my intention. All we have
seen is that there are certain perspectives on which large cardinal ax-
ioms appear restrictive, and that this calls into question the idea that
large cardinals assert the existence of ‘big’ sets in a straightforward
sense. Rather, large cardinal axioms postulate a careful calibration
between the largeness of ordinals and the kinds of subset that exist
within the universe. There are plenty of places where one can object to
the arguments essayed in this paper, and I am mindful of the phrase
“One person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens.” One might
take my observations to show that instead width absoluteness is not
a good measure of subset maximisation, or take this as a further false
positive for Maddy’s theory of restrictiveness. Either way, I think that
(i) the sense in which large cardinal axioms are taken to be clear exam-
ples of maximisation principles, and (ii) the idea that the truth (rather
than consistency in inner models) of large cardinals is an essential in-
gredient of any successful foundational programme are both deserv-
ing of serious philosophical scrutiny and require further foundational
support.
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